Qualitative portfolio allocation in European multiparty governments

How are ministerial portfolios allocated in multiparty governments? While Gamson’s Law suggests that the quantitative allocation is proportional to party size, considerably less is known about the qualitative dimension of distributing ministerial portfolios. Building upon recent advancements in portfolio allocation research, we explore party preferences for individual portfolios and the associated policy payoffs. Based on an original data set of party preferences for individual portfolios in Western and Central Eastern Europe, we show that bargaining power and issue diversity affect which parties are over- and what parties are under-compensated relative to their size. These findings provide empirical support for theoretical bargaining models and have implications for coalition governance, government termination, and public policy.

Montag, 17. Dezember 2018
17:30 – 19:00 Uhr,
Breitscheidstraße 2, Raum M 2.31
Alle sind herzlich eingeladen!