When legislating public policies, governments face the decision of prioritizing some problems while neglecting others. The outcome of this trade-off determines the content and dynamics of the legislative agenda. The paper provides a theoretical model and empirical strategy for analyzing these issue trade-offs in legislative agendas. Theoretically, I advances two propositions. First, political institutions shape the content of legislative agendas. In particular, broad-based societal issues are more prominent in proportional systems; while distributive issues are prevalent in majoritarian system. Second, executive’s attention to economic issues leads to an increase in economic issues on the legislative agenda and simultaneously removes other issue from legislative consideration. In other words, attention to when government needs to intervene in the economy determines how the legislative agenda looks like. The analysis relies on data from collected by the Comparative Agendas Project and covers a number of European countries and the United States from the time period from 1984 to 2004. I explicitly incorporate issue trade-offs by treating the content of legislative agendas as compositional data and employing a SUR regression model. The strength of the paper is that it examines legislative policy-making across all political issues (such as defense, health, education) and models them appropriately.