Limits of Media Freedom: The Epistemic Case

Are there plausible epistemic reasons for restricting media freedom? I distinguish between five forms of epistemically harmful media influence: (i) the spreading of wrong information; (ii) the spreading of non-evidential information that parades as evidence; (iii) the promotion of unhelpful cues, standards and ideologies for assessing available options; (iv) the loss of conceptual resources; and (v) the creation or promotion of echo chamber communication and motivated cognition effects. While the direct spreading of false or unhelpful information creates immediate epistemic harm, I will argue that a liberal state should not try to promote truth by assessing which views are correct or incorrect, as this is neither desirable nor practicable. However, I do suggest that there may be a case for putting restrictions in place to prevent systemic harmful effects. Interestingly, we may wish to regulate media not because of their individual epistemic failures but because they contribute unintentionally to systemic effects. This makes justifying such interventions challenging.

Montag, 26. Juni 2017, 17:30 - 19:00 Uhr; M 2.31

Alle sind herzlich eingeladen!